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S! Ca1.2d 320 to 'be false is not coram nobis but habeas 
PEOPLE v. ADAMSON. ~orpus. 
Cr. 4989. 
Supreme Court of California. in Bank. 
Sept. 29, 1949. 
Admiral Dewey Adamson was convicted of 
mprder in the Superior Court, Los Angeles 
County, Thomas L. Ambrose, J" and he ap· 
pealed from an order denying his motion to 
vacate in the nature of coram nobis. 
The Supreme Court, Schauer, J" dismissed 
the appeal holding that no grounds for relief 
within the scope of the writ of coram nobis 
were stated and that the petitioner failed to 
present credible allegations of fact which 
would constitute a prima facie case in any 
form of proceeding, 
Carter, J., dissented. 
I. Criminal law ~997 
Petition for coram nobis is in legal 
effect a motion to vacate a judgment. 
2. Criminal law ~997 
Purpose of "coram nobis" is to secure 
relief, where no other remedy exists, from 
a Judgment rendered while there existed 
some fact which would have prevented its 
rendition if trial court had known it and 
which through no negligence or fault of 
defendant was not then known to the 
court. 
See Words and Phrases, Permanent 
Edition, for other judicial constructions 
and definitions of "Coram Nobis", 
6. Habeas corpus ¢:::;)29 
Habeas corpus is proper proceeding to 
raise question of systematic, discriminato.ry 
exclusion of Negroes from grand jury. 
7. Habeas corpus ~25( I) 
Habeas corpus can be us~d to advance 
a defendant's contention of denial of right' 
to counsel, at least where no other re~edy . 
is available. . 
8. Criminal law ~991 ' . I 
Where a defendant seeks to vac,ate a 
solemn judgment of conviction, particularly' 
one affirmed on appeal, ,s-howing of dili-
gence essential to granting of relief by way 
of Coram nobis should he no less th!:lll 
similar showing required -in ,civi.1 Cases 
where relief is sought against lately dis-
covered fraud, and in such cases,' defendant· 
must 'aver not only probative fads upon 
which basic claim rests but also time and 
circumstances under which facts 'were: dis-
covered, and mere allegation of ultimate' 
facts or of legal conclusion of diligenc~ 
is insufficient. 
9. Criminal law ~991 
Where defendant contended that state 
used perjured testimony to obtain mu~~er' 
conviction and that method of se\ection 
of judges and jurors permitted' syste'matic 
exclusion of colored persons, and defendant 
3. Criminal law ~997 did not exercise due diligence in advancil'l:g 
Petition I for coram nobis must show contentions, no ground for relief was 
that f~cts upon which petitioner relies were stated within scope of writ of: cor.;tm 
:.lot known to him and could not in exercise nobis. 
of due diligence have been discovered at 
any time substantially e'arIier than time of 
hi,S motion for writ, otherwise no ground 
for relief is stated. 
-4. Habeas corpus ~29 
Habeas corpus is proper remedy to 
attack collaterally a judgment of conviction 
which ,has been obtained in violation of 
fundamental constitutional rights. 
5. Criminal law P991 
, Appropriate writ.ta'·secure relief from 
a' judgment of conviction obtained -by usc 
-.of fal~<::, te~timony ,knowp, by . ~rosecut.ion 
10. Criminal law ~997 
Petition for coram nobis arlit support~ . 
ing affidavits failed to state sufficient credo. -
ible facts from which trial court and, 
Supreme Court would be iustified in be-
lieving that defendant had. some expect9-nce 
of establishing his conc1usionary allegation~-; 
of violations of due process of la:w. U.,S.C~ 
A.Const. Amend. 14. 
II. Criminal law ~991 
Coram nobis proceeding is a 'Court-
made pi'oceeding, and, within 'liniits' of 
.constitutional requirements, is su~j~ct to, 
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such lirnit'ations ':ai1d procedural require.-
ments as creating court may prescribe. 
12. Criminal law ~997 
Coram nobis proceeding is not subject 
to all rules -applicable to an original trial 
hut is an attack upon a judgment which 
has become final and in favor of which 
there are strong presumptions of regularity, 
and petition is - regarded as a motion to 
vacate judgment arid not as a complaint 
nor 'does it initi'ate an independent action. 
13. Criminal law ~997 
Where state filed a demurrer to peti-
tion for a writ of coram nobis, Supreme 
Court- would not accept as true allegations 
in petition but would consider circumstances 
in which those allegations were made and 
state's affidavits controverting them. Pen. 
Code, § 1265. 
i4. Criminal law ~997 
In coram nobis proceeding, defendant 
failed ~o present credible allegations. of fact 
which would constitute a prima facie case 
for rylief in any' form of ,proceeding. 
15. Criininallaw'~641(4) 
Defendant's right to 'Counsel did not 
include right to postpone trial of a case 
indefinit~ly and reject services of public 
defender while defendant at his leisure 
at'te~pted to find counsel who would serve 
without charge and of whom defendant 
and another person approved. 
16. Criniinal law ¢:::;'304(1) 
Supreme Court can take judicial notice 
thaCit would 'be difficult to find in Califor-
nia any lawyers more experienced or 'better 
qualified in defending criminals than public 
defender of Los Angeles County and his 
staff. . . 
17. Criminal law ~IOOI.1131(4) 
Where proceeding in nature of an 
application for writ of coram nobis and 
appeal therefrom had as their object noth-
ing more 'than delay in execution of a 
judgment, stay of execution previously 
granted would be terminated, appeal from 
judgment denying petitioner 'Coram nobis 
would be dismissed, and trial court would 
be directed to proceed with execution of 
its sentence in manner provided by law. 
Morris Lavine, Los Angeles, for appel-
lant. 
Fred N. Howser, Attorney General, Wal-
ter L. Bowers, Assistant Attorney General" 
William E. Simpson, District Attorney,. 
Jere Sullivan .and Robert Wheeler, Deputy· 
Attorneys General, Los Angeles, for re-· 
spondent. 
SCHAUER, Justice. 
There are before this court defendant's: 
appeal from a' judgment denying his peti-
tion for coram nobis and th'e People's mo-
tions -that Ij;his court dismiss such appeal,. 
vacate all orders staying execution of the 
sentence,1 direct the trial court to proceed 
in the manner provided by law with execu-
tion of its sentence (which imposes the' 
death penalty), and direct immediate issu-
ance 'of the remittitur. For the reasons. 
hereinafter-stated, we have concluded that 
the motions of the' People should be grant-
ed. 
[!] By his petition for coram nobis. 
(which is, in legal effect, a motion to vacate 
a judgment [People v. Adamson (1949),33· 
Ca1.2d 286, 287-288, 201 P.2d 537]) defend-
ant attacks a' judgment of conviction of 
first degree" murder which has been affirmed 
by this court (People v. Adamson (1946),. 
27 Ca1.2d 478, 165 P.2d 3; rehearing de-
nied) and by the United States Supreme 
Court (Adams011 v. California (1947), 33Z-
U.S. 46, 67 S.Ct. 1672, 91 L.Ed. 1903, 171 
A.L.R. 1223; rehearing denied, 332 U.S. 
784, 68 S.C!. 27, 92 L.Ed. 367). He con-
tends: That he was given only two days in~ 
which to prepare his defense and was thus 
deprived of the right to effective aid of 
counsel. That "there has been a constant 
and systematic exclusion of colored persons. 
in ·the appointment of judges" of the Los. 
Angeles Superior Court, wherein ·he was. 
convicted, thus denying to defendant, a 
Negro, "due process of law and equal pro-
tection of the law." "That the mode and 
I. Tho only presently existing order staying execution is an order of this court made May 
4, 1949. 
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method of selection of jurors in Los 
Angeles -County was such as to permit 
systematic and persistent exclusion of mem-
bers of the colored or African race on ac-
count of nlC0 * * *, and that the jury 
commissioner called only white persons to 
attend the trial and try Admiral Dewey 
Adamson * * *, and that the jury 
selected to try your petitioner consisted en-
tirely of women, all white. That such pro-
ccdure and proceedings denied 'him the 
equal protection of the law and due process 
of law." That defendant was convicted 
upon false testimony of fingerprint experts 
and of Mrs. Frances Turner, used hy the 
State with knowledge of its f,alsity. 
The judgment attacked on the above 
g,rouncis was rendered on November 27, 
1944. It was affirmed on appeal On January 
4, 1946 (People v. Adamson, supra, 27 Cal. 
2d 478, 165 P.2cl 3); a petition for rehear-
i1lg was denied on January 31, 1946; and 
defendant was resentenced by the trial 
court on February 15, 1946. On June 23, 
1947, the United States Supreme Court 
affirmed the decision of this court (Adam-
son v.' California, supra, 332 U.S. 46, 67 S. 
Ct. 1672, 91 L.Ed. 1903, 171 A.L.R. 1223), 
and on October 13, 1947, that court denied 
a petition for rehearing, 332 U;S. 784, 68 
S.Ct. 27, 92 L.Ed. 367. On November 18, 
1947, ,the trial court set February 6, 1948, 
as the date for defendant's execution. On 
January 30, 1948, just one week before the 
dtlte set for his execution, defendant peti-, 
tion~d this court for the writ _ of h,,,beas 
corpus. The petition .was denied. The. 
United S.tates Supreme Court denied certio-
rari to this court (Adamson v. California 
(February 5, 1948),333 U.S. 831, 68 S.C!. 
610, 92 L.Ed. 1115). Thereafter (later in 
the day on February 5, 1948), a judge of 
the United States District Conrt granted a 
stay of execution to permit consideration of 
a petition for habeas corpus in that court. 
On February 16, 1948, the district judge 
denied the petition for habeas corpus and 
on March 2, 1948, he refused a certificate 
of probable cause for appeal. On Mar-ch 
29, 1948, the trial COl\ft again fixed a date 
for execution: June 4, 1948. Thereafter 
a judge of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit denied dofcml-
ant's application for certificate of prdbable 
cause for an appeal from the District Court 
order (Ex parte Adamson (May 11, 1948), 
167 F.2d 996). The United States Supreme 
Court denied certiorari to the Court of Ap-
peals (Ex porte Adamson (June 1, 1948), 
334 U.S. 834, 68 S.Ct. 1342, 92 L.Ed. 1761). 
On J nne 2, 1948, defendant filed his peti-
tion for coram nobis in the trial court and 
that court ordered execution srtayed ar:d 
issued its order to show cause why the 
petition should not be granted. The People 
then filed a "Motion for a Denial of the 
Relief Prayed For" with affidavits denying 
generally and controverting specifically the 
material allcgations of the petition, and al-
so a "Demurrer." On July 12, 1948, the 
trial 'comt made its order that "Demurrer 
to petition * * * is sustained without 
leave to amend." Defendant attempted to 
appeal from this non~appca1ab1e order (see 
People v. Adamson (1949), supra, 33 Cal. 
2d 286, 201 P.2d 537). After dismissal of 
this purported appeal the trial court, on 
February 15, 1949, heard argument and 
rendered the 'IIJ udgment Denying Petition 
for Writ of Error Coram Nabis" from 
which the present appeal is taken, and se,t 
May 6, 1949, as the date of execution. On 
April 25, ~949, defendant file4 with this 
court an application for stay of judgment 
pending appeal' and, some of the,' justices 
beillg of the view that defendant :ha-d shown 
probable cause for reversal, on May' '4, 1949, 
we grante~l d~fenda.nt's a'pplication 'for stay 
of execution. Aft~r further ·c'o'nsidctation 
we are satisfied' thh.t the appeal- ·ls' devoid 
of merit. 
The Failure to State any Ground for Re-
lief within the Scope of the Writ of 
Coram Nobis. 
[2,3] In this ·st.at.e a motion to vacate 
a judgtmcnt in the nature of a petition for 
coram nobis is a remedy ,0,£ narrow scope. 
(See People v. Darcy (1947), 79 CaLApp. 
2d 683, 693, 180 P.2d 752; People v. Mar-
tinez (1948), 88 CaLApp.2d 767, 774, 199 
P.2d 375.) Its purpose is to SeCU1"e relief, 
where no other remedy exists, from a 
judgment rendered. while there existed 
some fact which .""ould have prev~nted its 
rendition if the trial cour~ had known it 
and which, through no negligence, or fault 
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of the defendant, was not then known to 
the court. (People v. Gilbert (1944), .Z5 
Ca1.2d 42Z, 44Z, 154 P.Zd 657; In re Lind-
ley (1947),29 Cal.2d 709, 725·726, 177 P.2d 
918; People v. Tuthill (1948), 32 Ca1.Zd 
819, 821, 198 P.2d 505.) The applicant for 
the writ "must show that the facts upon 
which he relies Wefe not known to him and 
could not in the exercise of due diligence 
have been discovered by ,him at any time 
substantially earlier than the time of his 
motion for the writ; otherwise he has 
stated no ground for relief." (People v. 
Shorts (1948), 32 Ca1.2d 50Z, 513, 197 P.2d 
330, 336.) 
[4--7] With expansion of the function 
of habeas corpus in this state, an applica-
tion for that writ has become the proper 
remedy to attack collaterally a judgment of 
conviction which has been obtained in vio-
lation of fundamental constitutional rights. 
Thus, the appropriate writ to secure relief 
from a judgment of conviction obtained 
by the use of false testimony known by the 
prosecution to be false is not coram nobis 
but habeas corpus (In re Lindley, supra, 
page 725 of 29 Cal.2d, page 928 of 177 P.2d; 
see People v. Mooney (1918), 178 Cal. 525, 
174 P. 325; Mooney v. Holohan (1934), 
294 U.S. 103, 113, 55 S.Ct. 340, 79 L.Ed. 
791, 98 A.L.R. 406; In re Mooney (1937), 
10 Ca!.2d 1, 73 P.2d 554), although coram 
nobis has been used for' this purpose (see 
People v. Kirk (1946), 76 Ca1.App.2d 496, 
498, 173 P.Zd 367). And habeas corpus, not 
a nonstatutory motion to vacate the judg~ 
ment (in the nature of a petition for coram 
nobis), is the proper proceeding to raise 
the question of systematic, discriminatory 
exclusion of Negroes from the grand jury 
which indicted defendant, a Negro. (See 
People v. Montgomery (194Z), 51 Ca1.App. 
2d 444, 125 P.2d 108.) Habeas corpus can 
be used to advance th-e contention of denial 
of the right to counsel, at least where no 
other remedy is available. (See In re Egan 
(1944), 24 Ca1.Zd 323, 337, 149 P.2d 693, 
701 ["It may be assumed that a petitioner 
would be entitled to release on habeas cor-
ptis" if he could show that deprivation of 
counsel" resulted in an unfair trial or in 
substance' in "no trial at all"]; In reO Jingles 
(1946),27 Ca1.2d496, 498, 165 P.2d 12 
[proceeds directly to consideration of the 
merits of the contention, without discussing 
whether the writ is a proper remedy]; In 
re Tedford (1948), 31 Cal.Zd 693, 192 
P.2d 3 [same]; Inre McCoy (1948), 32 
Ca1.2d 73, 76, 194 P.2d 531 [habeas corpus 
is available where petitioner has no other 
adequate remedy]; see also In re Connor 
(1940), 16 Ca1.Zd 701, 705, 108 P.2d 10, 13 
[llUnder the general rule well established in 
this state, but which admits of some modi-
fication under exceptional circumstances, 
this contention cannot at this late date be 
made the basis of a successful collateral at-
tack by habeas corpus upon the validity of 
the judgment"; the contention could have 
been raised by direct appeal or by a non-
statutory motion to vacate the judgment].) 
Defendant's application for the writ of 
coram nobis ignores the above summarized 
holdings as to the respective functions of 
that writ and of habeas corpus. Appar-
ently defendant formerly recognized that 
in this state habeas corpus rather than 
coram nobis is the appropriate proceeding 
in which to raise the questions whether he 
was deprived of the right to counsel and 
whether there was discrimination against 
Negroes in the selection of judges and trial 
jurors in Los Angeles County, for he ad-
vanced these contentions in his petitions 
for habeas corpus addressed to this court 
and to the United States District Court. 
Defendant now repeats these contentions 
without suggesting any reason why he 
should be permitted to reiterate the same 
coIIateral attacks upon the judgment in 
various proceedings. Furthermore, he does 
not even attempt to make the showing 
fundamentaIly necessary for issuance of 
the writ of coram nobis j he does not sug-
gest that he was diligent in advancing these 
contentions. The facts as to the asserted 
deprivation of the effective aid of counsel 
and the asserted discriminatory exclusion 
of Negroes from bench and jury either 
were known to defendant or in the exercise 
of ordinary diligence should have been 
known to him (at least through his counsel) 
at the time of trial and defendant does not 
attempt to show that such facts were not 
known to the trial court, nor does he ex-
plain his failure to raise them in orderly 
PEOPLE v. ADAMSON Cal. 17 
Oite as 210 P.2d 13 
fashion on appeal from the 
conviction. 
judgment of States Supreme Court (as appellate courts 
[8] As to his contcntion that the 
State knowingly used perjured testimony, 
not only docs defendant present it in this 
inappropriate proceeding, but he does not 
comply with the requirement that he show 
that he ·has exercised due diligence. 
H[W]here a defendant seeks to vacate a 
solemn judgment of conviction, particularly 
where such judgment has been affirmed on 
appeal, the showing of diligence essential to 
the granting of relief by way of Coram 
nobis should be no less than the similar 
showing required in civil cases where relief 
is sought against lately discovered fraud. 
In such cases it is necessary to aver not 
only the probative facts upon which the 
basic claim rests, but also the time and cir-
cumstances under which the facts were dis-
covered, in order that the court can deter-
mine as a matter of law whether the liti-
gant proceeded with due diligence; a mere 
allegation of the ultimate facts Or of the 
legal conclusion of diligence, is insuffi-
cient." (People v. Shorts (1948), supra, 
32 Ca1.2d 502, 513, 197 P.2d 330, 337.) 
Defendant does not even mention the time 
and circumstances under which the asserted 
falsity of the fingerprint evidence was dis-
covered. Nor does he mention in his peti-
tion or supporting affidavits the time and 
circumstances of his asserted discovery that 
the prosecution used Mrs. Turner's testi-
mony with knowledge that it was false. 
His first and only attempt to make this 
essential explanation was before this court 
when he applied for a stay of execution. 
At that time he made the following vague 
averment: "The perjury involved par-
ticularly the testimony of Frances Jean 
Turner, a white woman, and was bas'ed 
upon an investigation made by a detective 
employed by friends of the accused, as 
her testimony weighed not only with this 
Court, but the United States Supreme 
Court in its consideration of the suffi-
ciency of the testimony." If Mrs. Turner's 
testimony was false, this fact was known to 
defendant at the time she testified, and he 
cannot be excused for his failure to raise 
the question of its falsity until after he 
discovered that this court and the United 
210 P.2d-% 
must do on appeal) gave credence to this 
evidence which .tends to support the judg-
mcnt of conviction. 
The FaIlure to Present Credible Allega-
tions of Fact which Would Constitute 
a Prima Facie Case in any Form of 
Proceeding. 
[9-13] The petition for coram nobis 
and supporting affidavits not only state a 
case wholly outside the tenable scope of 
the writ j they also fail to state sufficient 
credible facts from which the trial court 
(and this court) would be justified in be-
lieving that defendant had some expectance 
of establishing his conclusionary allega-
tions of violations of due process of Jaw. 
The proceeding designated "coram nobis" 
in this state is a court-made proceeding 
and, within the limits of the constitutional 
requirements pointed out in People v. 
Shorts (1948), supra, 32 Ca1.2d 502, 506, 
197 P.2d 330, must, therefore, be subject to 
such limita,tions· and procedural require-
ments as the creating court may prescribe. 
Such proceeding is not subject to all the 
rules applicable to an original trial; it is 
an attack upon a judgment which has be-
come final and in favor of which there are 
strong presumptions of regularity; the 
"petition" is regarded as a motion to vacate 
the judgment j it is not a complaint nor 
docs it initiate an independent action (In n: 
Paiva (1948), 31 Ca1.2d 503, 509, 190 P.2d 
604). The facts that the People filed inter 
alia a document entitled "Demurrer" and 
that the trial court made an order (super-
seded by the order now appealed from) 
that the "Demurrer * * * is sustained 
without leave to amend" did not require 
the trial court <'.nd do not require this court 
to accept every allegation of the petition 
and supporting affidavits at face value. 
The trial court considered, and we are en-
titled to consider, the circumstances in 
which those allegations were made and 
the People's affidavits controverting them. 
In the circumstances of the present case 
-a coram nobis attack upon a judgment 
which has become final after affirmance on 
appeal-we hold that this court, like the 
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trial court, has ((every right and the plain 
duty to scrutinize [defendant's claims] with 
a critical eye, in the light of its familiarity 
with the facts of this crime as they had 
been adduced in [the trial]." (Hysler v. 
Florida (1941), 315 U.S. 411, 417, 316 U.S. 
642,62 S.Ct. 688, 692, 86 L.Ed. 932.) This 
rule is the same whether the proceeding be 
before us on appeal or -on direct applica-
tion. (See Pen.Code, § 1265.) The Hysler 
case concerns the Florida procedure where-
by convicted defendants can, even after 
affirmance of the j uclgment on appeal, ob-
tain relief of the sort sought here; 1. e., 
"the judicial correction of a wrong com-
mitted in the administration of criminal jusw 
tice and resulting in the deprivation of life 
or liberty without due process" (page 415 
of 315 U.S., page 691 of 62 S.Ct.). "The 
state's security In the just administration 
of its criminal law must largely rest upon 
the competence of its trial courts. But 
that does not bar the state Supreme Court 
from exercising the vigilanc;e of a hard-
headed consideration of appeals' to it for 
upsetting a conviction" (i)age 422 of 315 
U.S., page 694 of 62 S.Ct.). And in giving 
such consideration we, like the'trial court, 
are- "not bound to accept at face. value 
the aHegations of ,the petition" (Taylor· 
v. Alabama (1948), 335 U.S. 252, 262, 
68 S.Ct. 1415, 1420, 92 L.Ed; 1935). 
[14] Before discussing separately the 
specific -contentions of defendant we note 
the fO,Howing matters whic,h bear upon the 
sinGerity of the whole. <?f ,his petition: He 
alJeges, "I desire to testify at the hc<:tring 
on my petition for writ O,£. er.ror coram 
explain or deny the evide.llce .against him 
an have such failure commented .upon by 
the prosecuting attorney and the trial court 
(see discussions of this problem, People v. 
Adamson (1946), supra, 27 Ca1.2d 478, 494, 
165 P.2d 3; Adamson v. California (1947), 
supra, 332 U.S. 46, 57, 67 S.Ct. 1672, 91 
L.Ed. 1903, 171 A.L.R. 1223). But we are 
justified in considering that defendant's 
belated desire to take the stand (not, it 
should be noted, before a jury, but only 
before a judge) is not becaus~ of any be-
lief that he can give testimony relevant to 
the asserted deprivations of constitutional 
rights (the allegations of his petition and 
af.6davit show that he can give very little 
testimony in this connection) but only to 
secure further delay. 
We are justified also in considering that 
defendant, after having, set forth in his 
petition all the contentions abo~e stated 
(210 P.2d 14), has on this appeal seen fit 
to confine his argument to one contention: 
that his allegations as to the .falsity of Mrs. 
Turner's testimony required th~t the ques-
tion of fact be tri.ed out. Yet' examination 
of the record of the trial discloses that, of 
all the matters complained of .in his peti-' 
6-on, the testimony of Mrs. Turner is by, 
far the least important. Furtherrnor,e we 
note that defendant is under sentence for 
four burglaries unconnected hi,' their com-
mIssion with the murder here under' con-
sic;leralion, and that such, four convicti~!ls. 
rest upon fingerprint evidence. of precisely 
th~ same character as that question~d here 
and were obtained before the sam~ judge 
and the verdicts were r:endered by" a jury' 
selected in the same manner as in the mur~ 
nobis,: or any other appropriate writ, for der case. Defendant is ~i~o under se'nten~e 
which ,this application is being considered, 
on the grounds that my rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the ,Constitution 
of the United States have been violated, 
and request that the court enter an order 
for my appearance at said hearing, or oth-
erwise grant an opportunity so that my 
deposition might be taken." At his trial 
defendant chose not to testify before the 
jury. He' was, to be sure, then confronted 
with a difficult choice: whether to take 
the stand and have prior convictions of 
felony disclosed to the jury, ~r to fail to. 
for a burglary connected in its ~ommission 
with the lllnrder; the verdict of gul1ty' of. 
that burglary re'sts upon precisely the same 
evidence and was rendered in, the same 
trial as the verdict of guilty of murder. 
Yet it is only the conviction of murder, 
carrying with it the death pen~1ty, which 
defenda'nt has questioned. We, are entitled 
to question the sincerity of contentions di-
rected only to the judgment which would 
deprive defendant of life and not, as they 
could be, to those judgments which depriVe! 
J?im of liberty. 
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We note, also, the lengthy history of at- Richard Bird was unsatisfactory ,to him 
tacks upon the judgment of death (210 P. • • • That he wanted counsel of his 
2d 15) and the fact that at all times since own choice and counsel chosen by Loyd 
defendant went to trial on the murder Wright, * * * with his approval and 
charge he has been represented by experi- consent." Of course defendant's right to 
enced and devoted counsel of his selection. counsel does not include the right to' post-
In these circumstances we cannot accept pone the trial of a case indefinitely and 
his allegations that he is "poor" and "igno- reject the services of the public defender 
rant" as an excuse for his failure to pre- while defendant, at his leisure, attempts to 
sent a convincing factual showing in su11- find counsel who will serve without charge 
port of his conc1usionary allegations of and of whom defendant and Mr. 'Wright 
want of due process. approve. (Sce People v. Manchetti (1946), 
Deprivation of Effective Aid 
of Counsel. 
As to this contention the records on ap-
peal from the judgment of conviction and 
th~ . judgment denying the petition for 
coram nobis show the following: 
Defendant was arrested on August 24, 
1944. A few days later, according to a 
police officer, defendant said, uWhen the 
time comes I will have my witnesses there 
to prove [an alibi defense], and I will be 
defended by one of the best attorneys in 
Los Angeles"; on August 28 and August 
31 defendant made similar statcments to 
the officer. 
[15, 16] At the preliminary hearing de-
fendant was represcnted by Mr. Ward 
Sulliva'n. The information was filed Sep-
tember 14, 1944. On September 18, 1944, 
defendant appeared for arraignment with-
out counsel; the public defender was ap-
pointed to represent him and trial was set 
for November 9,1944. On October 3, 1944, 
the public defender was allowed to with-
draw as counsel for defendant. Defend-
ant has not attempted to explain why Mr. 
Sullivan withdrew from the case; we can~ 
not assume that he withdrew in violation 
29 Cal.2d 452, 458, 175 P.2d 533, and cases 
there cited.) This court can take judicial 
notice, too, that it would be difficult to find 
in California any lawyers more exp'crienced 
or better qualified in defending criminal 
cases than the public defender of Los Ange-
les County and his staff. 
Mr. Safier, an associate of Mr. Morris 
Lavine, undertook to represent' ddendant 
on November 6, 1944, pursuant t(dl request 
of Mr~ Wright made to Mr., Lavine. On 
November 6 Mr. Safier requested and was 
refused a continuance. Four charges' of 
burglaries unrelated to the murder went 
to trial on November 9, 1944j on 'this trial 
defenda'nt was represented by both the pub-
lic defcnder and Mr. Safier. On Novem-
ber 14, when the trial of these four charges 
ended, the trial for murder and the bur-
glary connected therewith commenced' "at 
once, with Mr. Safier representing defend-
ant. Defendant did not testify and pro-
duced no witnesses. 
Defcndant alleges that he gave Mr. 
Safier Hthe namcs of eleven persons whose 
testimony he said was vital, some of whose 
addresses he fU'rnished and others whose 
addresses he could not furnish, most of 
which witnesses Adamson said could estab-
of his duty and against defendant's wishes. lish an alibi defense," but there was insuf-
The only attempt to explain why the public ficient time for Mr. Safier to locate and 
defender withdrew from the Case appears interview these witnesses. However, de-
in an affidavit of Mr. Milton Safier, who fendant has not seen fit <to identify these 
represented defendant at the trial. Mr. witnesses or to suggest what their testi-
Safier avers' that defendant "informed me many would be, other than allcging that 
that the court * * * without his wishes at about the time the murder was being 
o'r consent, 'appointed a Deputy Public Dc~ committed he was with his brother and 
fender to represent him but that the Deputy mother and tl,ereafter he "talked with Mrs. 
PU'blic Defender; named Richard Bird, was Robbie Babinean." In this proceeding we 
not an attorney of his choice j that he knew need not be so credulous as to believe that. 
~othing about Richard Bird's ability j that because Mr. Safier did not have more time 
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to prepare a defense, defendant coulc;l not the court appointed Harry Rogers of the 
produce his mother and brother as wit- sheriff's office. Mr. Rogers compared fi'n-
nesses. gerprints found in deceased's apartment 
Asserted Systematic Exclusion of Negroes 
from the Los Angeles Superior Court 
Bench and Jury Panel. 
The petition contains no suggestion of 
the manner in which defendant hoped to 
prove these allegations. When they were 
presented to the trial judge on argument 
as to 1he petition, he stated, t41 don't <be-
lieve you can prove anything of that sort." 
We are justified in concluding that defend-
ant's counsel agreed with this statement, 
for he made no attempt in the trial COUJ."It 
and has made no attempt in this court to. 
show that he 'has any expectance of estab-
lishing the allegations. 
The Fingerprint Evidence. 
Defendant has not suggested that he can 
produce any evidentiary facts to support 
the alleged conclusion that the fingerprint 
evidence was false and that the People 
knew of its falsity. Shortly after the be-
ginning of testimony on the rna-rning of the 
murder trial, the prosecuting attorney said 
.t hat "when we tried the other case against 
this defendant [the four burglary charges 
110t connected in their commission with .j;he 
<offenses now under consideration]. it in-
volved finger print testimony * • * and 
counsel, in commenting to the jury, in that 
,case, mentioned the fact that finger print 
{'xperts were expensive"; that the same 
fingerprint expert would testify for the 
People in the present case. The prosecut-
lng attorney requested and the trial court 
agreed that the court appoint as its own 
witness some expert who had had no con-
nection with the case. The judge stateq 
that he would appoint any qualified expert 
whom defendant's counsel sU'ggested. De-
fendant's counsel suggested Mr. Chester 
Allen. The judge replied that he knew 
Mr. A11en and did not wish to appoint him 
because he had not been in, fingerprint 
work for some 20 years. Appointment 'of 
the court's witness was postponed ·to give 
defendant's counsel an opportunity to find 
a qualified expert. He was apparently un-
able to find one satisfactory to him, and 
with defendant's prints, came to the con-
clusion that the prints found in the apart-
ment were those of defendant, -and so testi-
fied at the trial. 
On argument in the trial cou'rt as to the 
petition for coram nobis defendant pro-
duced as a witness the above mentioned 
Mr. Allen. Mr. Allen was permitted to 
take the stand rather than to give a sup-
porting affidavit. He testified that he had 
not been act'ive in fingerprint work for 
19 years and did not believe that he could 
qualify as an expert. Therefore, he was 
not allowed to give any evidence as to the 
comparison of the prints. (The averments 
as to the falsity of the fingerprint evi-
dence are contradicted by affidavits, filed in 
opposition to the petition for coram nobis, 
of the deputy district attorney who prose-
cuted defendant, the fingerprint expert who 
testified for the People, the court appointed 
fingerprint expert, the two police officers 
who investigated the homicide, the officer 
who originally found and photographed 
the fingerprints in deceased's apartment, 
and the officer who first entered deceased's 
apartment aiter the killing.) 
The fingerprints identified as defendant's 
at the trial were there described by the 
experts as "latent." In his affidavit de-
fendant avers upon information and belief 
that lila tent finger prints, unlike other 
types of finger prints, are inaccurate and 
subject to' many combinations and discrep-
a.ndes and. ,falsehoods; that these facts 
were known to the State." "Latent" prints, 
accordipg to the expert testimony at the 
trial (and this defendant does not ques-
tion), are simply prints left when the 
finger, slightly oily and damp with ordin-
ary body secretions, toU"ches a reasonably 
clean, s!11ooth surface, 1. e., the type of 
prints which constitute an essential part 
of the basis for virtually all fingerprint 
identification insofar- as connecting a de-
fendant with a particular crime is con-
cerned. In the absence of any sugge,stion 
of evidentiary facts to that effect, we need 
not -believe that defendant has discovered 
ev~<;le~ce tendiJ?g to show th~t practica11y 
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all expert testimony as to such fingerprint whereupon the man from the District At-
identification is false or mistaken or un- ,to'mey's office told her not to mention 
reliable. anything about dates." After defendant's 
The Testimony of Mrs. Turner. 
Although, as stated above, this is the 
only point which defendant has argued to 
this court, his petition minimizes its im-
portance by averring that "defendant was 
convicted principally, if not solely, upon 
[the finger print] evidence." 
conviction Mrs. Turner told Gaines "that 
at the time she gave her testimony in the 
case she thought she was testifyng for 
Dewey and testified exactly to what she 
had been told to say." (In 'Opposition to 
the petition for coram nobis the People 
filed an affidavit of Mrs. Turner that her 
testimony "was true at the time it was 
The murder was committed and de- given at said trial and is now true."J 
ceased's diamond rings disappeared about At the time of argument on the petition 
July 25, 1944. The witness Turner testi- ' Mrs. Turner, who had been subpren;red by 
fied that at a time between the 10th and Mr. Lavine, was present in the court room. 
the 14th of August, 1944, she overheard 
defendant ask an unidentified man in a 
bar whether he would like to buy a dia-
mond ring. In his affidavit defendant 
aVers on information and belief that Mrs. 
Turner's husband was "WIder investigation 
for theft" and that she. agreed to testify 
as the People wished in return for a 
promise that her husband would not he 
prosecuted. An affidavit of Mr. Harold 
Gaines contains the only direct allegations 
of evidentiary facts tending to support de-
fendant's assertion that the People know-
ingly used false testimony. Such allega-
tions are: About two days ·before Mrs. 
Turner testified at the trial of Adamson, 
Gaines saw her at a bar with a man un-
known to Gaines. Thereafter, Mrs. Tur-
ner told Gaines that the man was "the 
District Attorney" and that "she did not 
know Why the District Attorney wanted 
her to testify in Dewey's case, because she 
didn't know anything about it." The next 
morning, while Gaines was at Mrs. Tur-
ner's home, a man arrived and said that 
"he wanted her to go down town with him 
to the District Attorney's office." Mrs. 
Turner left with this man. She returned 
with the same man and told Gaines -that 
in the district attorney's office she had been 
shown "some horrible pictures of a de-
ceased woman * * *; that they told 
her that was what they had Dewey for." 
She asked Gaines Hwhat date it was that 
However, since the trial court concluded 
that the. petition and supporting affidavits 
did not require the trying out of issu'es of 
fact, he did not permit defendant to call 
Mrs. Turner to the stand. Independently 
reappraising the credibility and effect of 
the Gaines affidavit in, the light of all the 
facts before us, we conclude that such affi-
davit does not sufficiently show a depriva-
tion of due proce'ss. Defendant has not 
attempted to explain why, although he 
must have known that Mrs. Turner's testi-
mony was false (if it was false) at the 
time it was given, he did not raise this 
poi~t until, nearly three years and nine 
months after he was convicted, he filed hi, 
petition for coram nobis. We are not in-
formed who Mr. Gaines is or why year3 
elapsed between the trial and the makin~ 
of his affidavit. The averments of the 
Gaines affidavit do not support the asser· 
tion, found only in the affidavit of defend· 
ant and only upon information an4 belief, 
that Mrs. TUrner gave false testimony in 
return for a promise by an unidentified 
officer of the State that her husband would 
not be prosecuted for theft. In striking 
contrast 10 the lack of allegations c.oncern-
ing the discovery of the relevant facts 
averred in the Gaines affidavit, are defend-
ant's detailed, lengthy allegations as to 
other matters, some unimportant, some in-
competent, and practically all known to de-
fendant at the time of his trial, concerning 
Dewey 'wanted to sell Tim the rings." Mrs. Turner and her testimony. 'Defend~. 
Gaines replied that he had not been present. ant devotes a large portion of his petition· 
on any such occasion. "Then Frances Jean and affidavit to describing a causa," sociai , 
Turner said perhaps she was mistaken, meeting of Mrs. Turner and defendan., 
Cal.Rep. 209 .. 210 P,2d--31 
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which took place after the murder and be-
fore defendant's arrest and which has no 
connection with the crime. The petition 
and supporting affidavits contain a number 
of 'al1e'gations such as the {allowing: De-
fendant's counsel avers on information and 
belief that after defendant's conviction an 
unidentified person interviewed, by tele-
phone, one Dauzat, owner of the bar where, 
according to Mrs. 'Turner's testimony, she 
overheard defendant's conversation regard-
ing rings, and Dauzat "inferred to the in-
terviewer that this woman was not a per-
son of reputable character~ He also stated 
that petitioner Adamson frequently came 
into the place and was not a drinking man, 
preferring coca-cola, and that he never 
knew Adamson to be other than a perfect 
gentleman; that throughout 'his experience 
in this type of business he found that when 
a party wanted to make some kind of a 
deal he would not discuss it at the bar, 
where talk could be overheard, he would 
do so· in a pr'ivate conversation, and that 
from his assodation with petitioner Adam~ 
son and his observation of Adamson while 
in the establishment, he was of the opinion 
that Adamson would not think of discuss-
ing any business at the bar. He further 
stated that he does not believe that Frances 
Turner ever "heard Adamson in this dia-
mond ring conversation, but thinks that she 
testified as she did because she wanted 
to dear herself from any association with 
colored men." Harold Gaines avers in his 
affidavit that "During all of the time I 
have known Frances Jean Turner I have 
known her to be a steady drinker and a 
confirmed drunkard and a person who 
sought the limelight." Defendant avers in 
his affidavit that Mrs. Turner "was a white 
woman who had been out with Dewey 
Adamson, had visited his home and that 
she had -had drinks with the said Dewey 
Adamson." These and similar averments, 
incompetent to establish defendant's con-
tention that Mrs. Turner perjured herself, 
are relevant to a determination of the sin-
cerity with which that contention is ad-
vanced. By seeking to buttress ·a conten-
tion of deprivation of due process with al-
legations such as those last quoted, defend~ 
ant and his counsel indicate a desperate re~ 
solve to delay execution of judgment rather 
than a sincere attempt to presellt 'a serious· 
question of fact and law. 
Upon the showing made to us nearly five 
years after the judgment of con,:,iction was 
rendered, we conclude that 'lit is asking 
entirely too much of the court to believe'" 
the allegations of the petition and support-. 
jng affidavits (see Taylor v. Alabama 
(1947), supra, 335 U.S. 252, 271, 68 S.Ct. 
1415, 1424; 92 L.Ed. 1935); we can only 
believe that this proceeding in the nature 
of an application for coram nobis and the 
appeal therefrom have had as their object 
nothing more than delay in the execution 
of the judgment under attack. 
[17] For the reasons above stated, the 
stay of execution heretofore granted is 
terminated, the appeal from the judgment 
denying the petition for coram ,nobis is dis~ 
missed, and the trial court is directed to 
proceed with execution of its sentence in 
the manner provided by law. (See People 
v. Shorts (1948), supra, 32 Cal.2d 502, 518, 
197 P.2d 330.) Let the remittitur issue 
forthwith. 
GIBSON, C. J., and SHENK, TRAY-
NOR, and SPENCE, JJ., concur. 
EDMONDS, Justice. 
I concur in the judgment solely upon 
the ground that relief by coram nobis was 
properly denied because habeas 'corpus is 
the availflb.le and proper remedy. The 
courts developed the modern use of the 
writ of error coram nobis in an era when 
it furni·shed the only remedy for reviewing 
certain serious errors. However, in re-
cent years, generally, sp'eaking, habeas cor~ 
pus has been made available for the cor-
rection of errors withi~ the category of 
lack of procedural due process of law. In 
re McCoy, 32 CaJ.2d 73, 194 P.2d 531; In 
re Jingles, 27 Cal.2d 496, 165 P.2d 12; In 
re Mooney, 10 CaJ.2d 1, 73 P.2d 554. Ac-
cordingly, the compelling necessity for the 
use of a writ of error coram nobis is no 
longer present. Moreover, the enlarged 
use of habeas corpus avoids the necessity 
for the time consuming practice of making 
an application for relief in the trial court 
PEOPLE' v. ADAMSON Cal. 23 
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followed by an appeal from an adverse de- the petition and affidavits of petitioner. 
termination.1 See People v. Nixon and But in addition to the foregoing, I do not 
Murphey, Cal.Sup., 209 P.2d 385; People believe it is the function of this Court to 
v. Shorts, 32 Ca1.2d 502, 197 P.2d 330. pass upon the credibility and Hsincedty" of 
The effect of the present decision is to petitioner's pleadings. Likewise, the trial 
foreclose in the future most, if not all, of ct;mrt should not do so in ruling on a de-
the present uses of the writ of error coram murrer. 
nobis, for there are no signifIcant situa-
tions where that writ might be used in 
which habeas corpus is not now available. 
This result reflects sound policy directed to 
protection of the rights of persons im-
properly convicted, and at the same time 
expedites the efficient administration of 
justice. 
I do not agree with the protracted dis-
cussion in the majority opinion as to the 
procedure for obtaining coram nobis and 
the nature of the proceeding. (See dis-
sent, In re Paiva, 31 Cal.2d 503, at page 
511, 190 P.2d 604.) The opinion holds 
that "vVith the expansiqn of the function 
of habeas corpus in this state, an applica-
tion for that writ has become the proper 
remedy to attack collaterally a judgment 
of conviction which has been obtained in 
violation of fundamental constitutional 
rights." By that rule, the modern use of 
the writ of error coram nobis is judicially 
{(repealed" and it is entirely urinecessary 
to discuss rules of pleading applicable to a 
proceeding which it is said may not be 
maintained. If consideration of those prin-
ciples were proper, I would state my rea-




While it may be true that defendant has 
failed to allege sufficient facts to show due 
diligence-why he .did ,not discover SOoner 
the basis for his atta~k on .the judgment 
<lnd proceed accordingly, yet the demurrer 
to his petition should not have been sus-
tained without leave to amend. He may 
be able to al1ege facts .which would show 
diligence and should be given the oppor-
tunity to do so. Those co'mments are also 
applicable to the other allcged defects in 
I. The .1949 amendment to section 1265 
of the Penal Oode hfts avoiul,ld some of 
This Com-t is merely reviewing the ac-
tion of the trial court in sustaining a de-
murrer interposed by the People. In so 
doing it must give full weight to the trial 
court's determination the same as in any 
other case. The majority opinion gives no 
reason and cites no authority for the 
unique proposition that a different rule ap-
plies to the pleadings in a coram nobis pro-
ceeding than that appiicable to pleadings 
in other proceedings. The majority opin-
ion is replete with statements that the al-
legations cannot be believed, that they are 
not sincere, that they are mere conclusions 
and the like. On demurrer all the pleaded 
facts must be taken as true-:-must be be-
lieved. That is especially true where the 
demurrer is general. Moreover, they must 
be liberally construed. Hudsot) v .. Craft, 
33 Ca1.2d 654, 204 P.2d 1.' Certainly when 
a man's life is in the balance and consti-
tutional issues are raised, tlIe, rule of liber-
al construction is eveD' ,mo'r~' il~perative 
than in the ordina~y case:' It is said in 
People v. Long, 34<i Ill. 64<i, 178'N.E. 918, 
919: "The facts ,set out were S,llmFiently 
definite to raise the issue of :whettler the 
plea of guilty was entered ,through an ex-
cusable mistake or igl'lOrahce of the, ac-
cused, and whether he was deprived of ,a 
substantial defense which he might have 
urged on his trial. Under such circum-
stances, the trial court could not arbi-
trarily refuse a full hearing upon the peti-
tion. The allegations 6f a petition 'need 
be only prima facie sufficient for th'e' grant-
ing of such a hearing." See also, Howie 
v. State, 121 Miss. 197, 83 So. 158, 10 A. 
L.R. 205. 
If the facts stated in the petition and af-
fidavits, taken at their face value, are in-
sufficient as a matter of law to constitute 
a g-round or basis for relief, the demurrer 
the present procedural steps. (Stats. 
1049, Ch. 1309 [A.B. 25751.) 
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should have been sustained, and, in the ab-
sence of an amendment setting forth fur~ 
ther facts, that should be· the end of the 
story. The discussion in the majority 
opinion relative to the good faith and sin~ 
cerity of petitioner and his counsel in mak-
ing the statements contained in the peti-
tion and affidavits, goes entire1y beyond the 
scope of the review which this Court is 
called upon to make in deciding the issue 
presented by this appeal. 
I would reverse the judgment and direct 
the trial court to permit petitioner to 
amend his petition if he be so advised. 
o im ~~""',,:;;.;;:,"""sv"''''''.~ 
t 
H<lWARD GREER CUSTOM ORIGINALS 
v. CAPRITTI et al. 
Clv. 17036. 
DIRtrict Court of Appeal, Second District, 
Division I, CalifornIa. 
Oct. 3, 1049. 
Rebearlng Granted Nov. 1, 1949. 
See 213 P.2d 78. 
Howard Greer Custom Originals, sued J. 
C. Otprlttl, doing business under the ficti-
tious firm name and style of Rose MarIe of 
CalifPlrnia, and other fictitious defendants, 
and Rose Marie of California, Inc., sued as 
Black and White Company, for claim and 
delivery, conversion and damages for breach 
of contrac~ wherein a cross-complaint was 
filed by the corporate defendant. 
A default judgment was entered against 
the defendant, .1. C. Capritti, and its motion 
to set aside the default was denied by the 
Superior Court of the County of Los An-
geles, Stanley N. Barnes, J., and 'such de-
fendant alone appealed. 
'..rhe District Court of Appeal, Drapeau, 
J., affh'med the order on gl'ound that de-
fendant -had fniled to, prove any of the 
grounds provided for under statute which 
would enable trial court to grant' relief re-
quested. 
I. Appeal and error ~113(1) 
An order denying motion under stat-
ute to set aside judgment as taken through 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusa-
ble neglect, is appealable. Code Civ.Proc. 
§ 473. 
2. Judgment ¢::::>139 
In considering motions to set aside de-
faults, trial court must exercise a sound 
and legal discretion in such matter as to 
serve and not defeat or impede ends of 
substantial justice. Code Civ.Proc. § 473. 
3. Judgment ¢::::>363 
The statute authorizing court to relieve 
party from judgment taken against him 
through his mistake, inadvertence, sur-
prise or excusable neglect, is remedial and 
should be liberally construed so as to dis-
pose of cases on their substantive merits 
and give party claiming meritorious right 
in good faith opportunity to present it. 
Code Civ.Proc. § 473. 
4. Appeal and error ¢::::>982(2) 
Reviewing courts will scan more close-
ly and are more prone to reverse orders 
denying relief from judgments on ground 
of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or ex-
cusable neglect than orders granting such 
retid, but the rule not to disturb trial 
court's action except in ~Iear case of abuse 
of discretion has not been relaxed. Code 
Civ.Proc. § 473. 
5. Appeal and error ~I008(3) 
On appeal from order made on affi-
davits, involving the decision of a question 
of fact, appellate court is bound by same 
rule that controls it where oral testimony is 
presented for review, and if there is any 
conflict in affidavit, those in favor of pre-
vailing party must be t~ken as true, and 
fact stated therein must be considered to be 
established. 
6. Appeal and error ~948 
On appeal from order denying motion 
under statute to set aside default judgment, 
burden of convincing that denial of mo-
tion was an abuse of discretion was on ap-
pellant. Code Civ.Proc. § 473. 
7. Judgment «=>162(4) 
Affidavits supporting and opposing in-
dividual defendant's motion to set aside de-
fault judgment 'under statute as taken 
through mistake, surprise, inadvertence, or 
